From Islamabad to Moscow: The Taliban Seek New Partners
With the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, it was not only a political system in Kabul that collapsed, an old regional equation also began to change. For years, Afghanistan had remained within Pakistans sphere of influence, but today it is entering a new phase of competition among several regional powers.
For decades, Islamabad viewed Afghanistan as part of its strategy of strategic depth and the Taliban were considered one of the main tools of that policy.Many Taliban leaders lived in Pakistan, the group’s communication and logistical networks were developed there and it was widely believed that the Taliban’s return to power would strengthen Pakistan’s position in Kabul.
However, after 2021 this calculation gradually began to fall apart. The Taliban did not become a fully aligned partner of Islamabad. In some cases, they even turned into a security challenge for Pakistan. At the same time, Russia, China and other regional actors sought to use the gap between Kabul and Islamabad to expand their own influence.
This raises an important question: Have the Taliban truly moved out of Pakistan’s sphere of influence, or are are they simply trying to survive by balancing relations among several regional powers?
This shift marks the beginning of a deeper change in Afghanistan’s relations with the region, a change rooted in the gradual weakening of the Taliban-Pakistan relationship.
From Strategic Asset to Security Threat: Why Taliban-Pakistan Relations Deteriorated
The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan was never an ordinary relationship between two neighboring countries. It was built on security cooperation, intelligence ties and long term political support. From Islamabad’s perspective, the Taliban were one of the most important tools for maintaining influence in Afghanistan and balancing regional competition particularly with India. But after the Taliban returned to power, those expectations were not fully met.
The biggest source of disagreement became the issue of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan(TTP). Islamabad expected the Taliban to take action against the group or at least limit its activities. However, the Taliban largely avoided direct confrontation and often tried to act as mediators between the two sides.
For Pakistan, this was seen as ignoring its security concerns. Over time, many Pakistani officials concluded that the Taliban no longer considered themselves committed to Islamabad’s strategic priorities. Disputes over the Durand Line added further pressure to the relationship. Border crossings were closed at times and occasional clashes pushed the relationship from cooperation toward mistrust and rivalry.
As a result, a group once viewed as one of Pakistan’s “strategic assets” has become a factor that complicates Pakistan’s own security calculations. A relationship once built on trust and shared interests has gradually become one in which both sides view each other as unpredictable actors.
This shift in perception also created space for a broader change in the Taliban’s behavior, a change focusd less on Pakistan and more on redefining the Taliban’s political identity.
The Taliban’s Search for Independence: Reality or Survival Strategy?
Since returning to power the Taliban have tried to present themselves as an independent government whose foreign policy is not defined solely through Pakistan.
Their growing engagement with Russia, China, Iran and Central Asian countries reflects this effort. The Taliban want to show that they are not dependent on a single path for international engagement.
However the picture is more complicated. The Taliban still face a crisis of international legitimacy, economic pressure and political isolation. For this reason, what is described as independence is often more about survival through diversifying foreign relations than about pursuing a fully independent foreign policy.
In practice, the Taliban appear to be following a balancing strategy, reducing dependence on Pakistan while using relations with other powers to strengthen their position.
Russia’s Entry: Filling a Changing Power Vacuum
As relations between the Taliban and Pakistan have weakened, Russia has gradually expanded its role in Afghanistan. For years, Moscow approached Afghanistan with caution. Today, however Russia has accepted the Taliban as the de facto authority in Kabul. This shift has led to increased diplomatic contacts and security discussions between the two sides.
In recent months, talks between Taliban and Russian defense officials have also increased, suggesting that cooperation is moving beyond politics and into the security sphere.
However, Russia’s goal is not to build an ideological alliance with the Taliban. Moscow views the Taliban more as a tool for managing regional security threats than as a long-term strategic partner. Russia’s main concern is the expansion of ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan Province) which could threaten the security of Central Asia and even Russia’s southern borders. For Moscow, engagement with the Taliban is more of a security necessity than a political choice.
Ultimately, this relationship is not simply a bilateral partnership. It is part of a broader picture in which Afghanistan has moved beyond the influence of a single power and become an arena for competition among several regional actors.
The Taliban: From the Tool of One Power to the Focus of Many
If the Taliban were once largely viewed through the lens of their relationship with Pakistan, Afghanistan has now become a stage for competition among multiple regional powers.
Pakistan is trying to preserve what influence it still has Russia is focused on containing security threats. China is concerned about security in Xinjiang and the protection of its economic projects. Iran is paying close attention to border issues, migration and water resources. Meanwhile, Central Asian countries are working to prevent instability from spreading into their territories.
What is important to note is that none of these countries see the Taliban as an ideological partner or a reliable ally. Rather they engage with the Taliban because they are the reality in power in Kabul. The Taliban are also trying to use this competition to their advantage by balancing relations with different powers. However, this balancing act is highly fragile. Moving out of the orbit of one power does not mean true independence. It can simply mean entering the orbit of competition among several powers.
As a result, the Taliban are no longer defined by a single relationship. They have become part of several regional agendas. This position presents both opportunities and risks. In such circumstances the key issue is no longer simply the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan or Russia, but how they manage this broader competition.
Conclusion: Leaving Pakistan’s Shadow Does Not Mean Ending Dependence
Recent developments suggest that what is happening in Afghanistan is not merely a change in foreign relations, it is a shift in the regional balance of influence.
Pakistan’s long standing dominance is gradually weakening, but this does not mean that the Taliban have become fully independent. The Taliban still need engagement with foreign powers to survive politically, manage the economy and reduce international pressure.
The difference today is that there is no longer just one gateway to that engagement, several powers are now competing for influence in Kabul. Just as Pakistan once sought to use the Taliban to advance its own interests, Russia,China and other regional actors are now trying to benefit from Afghanistan’s new reality.
The central question is therefore no longer whether the Taliban have distanced themselves from Pakistan. The real question is whether they can avoid becoming a tool in the rivalry of regional powers once again.
The answer to this question will help determine not only the futur of the Taliban, but also Afghanistan’s place in the emerging regional order.